Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter PDF

By Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter Bamberg, Prof. Dr. Klaus Spremann (eds.)

ISBN-10: 3540516751

ISBN-13: 9783540516750

ISBN-10: 3642750605

ISBN-13: 9783642750601

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Extra resources for Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

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As an homo economicus, the agent would be indifferent if his welfare was unchanged. Might be the principal is willing to increase that reservation level m and is, nevertheless, better off. A principal prepared to modify m can expect that the agent looks by himself for signals that inform on his effort. Another point is that some kinds of monitoring devices cause additional disutilities to the agent which need compensation. Consequently, there are three reasons why the introduction of monitoring signals can be costly.

1). 2 and section 4) we shall drop this assumption and introduce a functional relationship between the expected val ue of X and the managers' input. The properties of the "production" function are discussed in the next subsection. As is well known, the combination of a CARA utility function with a normally distributed random variable results in a mean-variance model. The popularity of the mean-variance approach is due to the property that risk is fully described by the variance of the random variable.

Bell Journal of Economics 6 (1975), 552-579. : Risk Sharing and Incentives in Sharecropping. Review of Economic Studies 61 (1974), 219-256. STIGLITZ, JOSEPH E. and ANDREW WEISS: Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review 71 (1981) 3, 393-410. SWOBODA, PETER: Kapitalmarkt und Unternehmensfinanzierung - Zur Kapitalstruktur der Unternehmung. Diskussionspapier Graz 1986. Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information Hellmuth Milde Summary This paper is concerned with the relationship between a principal and an agent.

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Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter Bamberg, Prof. Dr. Klaus Spremann (eds.)

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